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The Scope of Eurasian Integration
Geographical boundaries of investigation
There are two main generalizations that are used in describing the
development of globalization over recent decades. One is that the level
of economic, political and cultural interdependence of almost all coun-
tries is continually increasing. The other is that this increase is not
uniform: some areas of the world are more ‘globalized’ than others.1
In fact, globalization resembles a web with three main nodes – Europe,
North America and Asia-Pacific – and several loopholes. Some of the
loopholes emerged due to the lower level of economic development
in the ‘global south’, which restricted certain countries’ opportunities
to engage in the process of globalization: for example, Sub-Saharan
Africa has until recently been a ‘weak link’ in the global economic
chain (although the current burgeoning of information technologies
and mobile telephony could challenge this equilibrium2). China until
the 1980s and the Soviet bloc until the end of the 1980s represented
yet another loophole in the web of developing global economy. The
socialist countries concentrated either on maximizing their autarchy
or on cooperating primarily within the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance.
The globalization process involves, first of all, the deepening of inter-
dependencies within the nodes; secondly, the extension of economic
links between the nodes (currently represented most prominently by
the growth of trade between China and the European Union and the
United States); and thirdly, the expansion of the nodes to incorporate
initially more peripheral areas. The development of the former Socialist
countries in the last two decades seems to be a good example of this
trend. The collapse of the bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s opened
9
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10 The Concept of Eurasian Integration
this region up to globalization; however, different countries followed
somewhat different paths at different times. Originally, the key partners
for most countries in the former Soviet bloc that managed to enter inter-
national markets were developed European economies. Some countries
in the region (especially in Central Asia) remained relatively isolated
from the global market. In the mid-2000s, the post-Socialist area divided
into two groups of countries: Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which
had a relatively high level of income and intensive trade with developed
countries, and the former Soviet Union (FSU), which had a lower level
of income and trade dominated by commodities.
The rise of China, which can also be traced back to the 1980s–
1990s, challenges this original Europe-centric path of global integration.
Currently, China is slowly but surely becoming an important trade
and investment partner for at least some of the post-Socialist coun-
tries. Moreover, the post-Socialist countries have remained relatively
highly interconnected; existing research confirms that there is ‘stick-
iness’ in trade between countries of the former Soviet bloc, which
seems to be reinforced by the emergence of new multinationals in the
region.3
Over the last 20 years, therefore, there has been a very interesting
change in the spatial structure of the globalization web: its original
loophole in Central and Northern Eurasia seems to have been replaced
by a new web connecting Europe, the former Soviet bloc and China.
‘Before then’, as Johannes Linn explains, ‘the self-imposed isolation of
China and the Soviet Union created serious obstacles – symbolized by
the Bamboo and Iron Curtains. They prevented a participation of the
continent in the post-World War II globalization process, which was
driven by the rapid growth of cross-oceanic links between Europe and
the US and between the US and East and South East Asia.’4 They are
now rapidly catching up. The economic network is supplemented by an
increasing number of political and institutional structures incorporating
the region’s countries. Thus, while the European and Asian-Pacific poles
of economic development in the Eurasian continent were originally
clearly separated from each other geographically, the presence of Central
and Northern Eurasia makes the border between them more indistinct.
Russia – at least potentially – could belong to both of them. The prob-
lems of the FSU, Europe and East Asia are becoming more and more
intertwined, and often coordinated policies are called for. ‘This process
of integration is now in full swing, connecting some of the largest and
most dynamic economies of the world – China, India, Russia – with
each other and with an expanding European Union [translated by the
authors].’5
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These new linkages, their evolution, their potential and their impor-
tance for economic development and policy making are the main
subjects we investigate in this book. As mentioned in the introduction,
we will refer to the emerging economic, political and social integration
involving three poles – the FSU, Europe and East Asia – as Eurasian
integration. As a caveat, we should mention that we pay greater atten-
tion to land connections on the continent than to sea connections (that
is, developed maritime transport between Europe and China). The rea-
sons for this bias are pragmatic ones: we are covering a topic which has
so far received much less attention from researchers, and we need to
assess its importance to our understanding of regional dynamics. It is
important to understand, however, that the land connections and sea
connections (and hence trans-oceanic and transcontinental) integra-
tion are very different in terms of infrastructure, policy and governance.
An obvious issue is that transcontinental trade inevitably crosses bor-
ders of multiple jurisdictions, which are required to show at least some
level of cooperation. Furthermore, it is very often much more costly in
terms of infrastructure required (railroads or roads) than the maritime
trade. This infrastructure should be, once again, jointly constructed and
maintained by many countries.
The fact that sea is able to connect more than land in the absence
of large-scale international cooperation has been known to mankind
since the Phoenicians and ancient Greeks. That is why the develop-
ment of the global economy in the last centuries mostly took place
along the lines of trans-oceanic trade (although there have been some
notable cases of transcontinental integration – for example, the creation
of an integrated market in the United States and in North America or of
the centralized Soviet economy). There are, however, some examples of
trade where trans-oceanic linkages have been less developed than the
transcontinental ones: examples include oil and gas, to some extent,
and also illicit drug trade, which is mostly land-based. In what follows,
we will look at the problems of continental trade as opposed to oceanic
trade more precisely.6
The very definition of the subject of our study reveals two impor-
tant problems. Firstly, we are investigating integration within a region,
which can be characterized as an emerging or, more realistically, as a
probable one. Defining regional boundaries for the purpose of study-
ing regionalism and regionalization has always posed a dilemma for
researchers and for policy makers, even in well-established regions. For
Eurasian integration, the problem becomes worse. From an essential-
ist perspective (which defines regions as groups of countries exhibiting
objective economic or political interdependencies), the structure of
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economic and political ties is not clear, and therefore it is difficult to
gauge the degree to which regional integration can indeed be treated as a
‘natural’ form of integration; we will show that in Eurasia we are dealing
rather with multiple overlapping ‘optimal spaces’ of regional integra-
tion. From the constructivist perspective (for which regions are merely
‘spaces defined as regions’, i.e. socially constructed and ‘imagined’ enti-
ties), an emerging region is a battlefield of multiple concepts and ideas,
and this is true for Eurasian integration, since the very concept of Eurasia
is not often neutral in terms of the values attributed to it.
In our exploration of Eurasian integration, we actually use a concept
of five macroregions with sometimes indistinct borders, covering the
whole Eurasian landmass. These are ‘Europe’, ‘Northern and Central
Eurasia’, ‘East Asia’, ‘South Asia’ and ‘West Asia’ (see Figure 2.1). Our
main focus is on the first three of these regions. South Asia and West
Asia will be considered in much less detail. We adopt this approach for
reasons which are, once again, more pragmatic than conceptual, in that
it allows us to focus on developments which, in our opinion, are more
interesting in terms of the growing interconnection between Eurasian
macroregions that they represent and which, to our knowledge, have





Figure 2.1 Macroregions of Eurasia
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received less attention in the literature. However, one should not forget
that the weak boundaries of Eurasian integration make it open to other
players. Therefore, in discussing particular types of Eurasian economic
linkage, we take countries outside our three major regions of investi-
gation into account if their role in these emerging linkages is to some
extent critical.
In this context, two countries should be mentioned specifically: India
and Turkey. While most attempts to establish a ‘Eurasian’ regional inte-
gration project have been initiated by post-Soviet countries (particularly
Russia and Kazakhstan), a recent proposal to create a ‘Eurasian Union’
came from the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu,
in spring 2010.7 Turkey is closely linked to the European Union, and
aspires to join it, but it also traditionally maintains strong ties with the
post-Soviet Turkic states (Central Asia and Azerbaijan). Although early
attempts to achieve dominance in this region in the mid-1990s failed,
the current cultural, economic and political influence of Turkey should
not be discounted. Turkey has its own tradition of ‘Avrasya’ (Eurasian)
thinking, which bears interesting parallels with Russia. India also seems
to be a potential player in the emergence of Eurasian linkages, especially
in the field of transport, as discussed further below.
A further problem is that the three component regions of Eurasian
integration are difficult to define. We do not think an exact definition of
each macroregion is of crucial importance here (this is also why we did
not plot the exact borders of each region in Figure 2.1): economic link-
ages rarely follow the ‘official’ definition of the regions, nor necessarily
does the political cooperation. However, from an analytical perspec-
tive, our inability to define the geographical components of Eurasian
integration more clearly should be pointed out.
The easiest component to define is Europe, where the European Union
(EU) represents a structure encompassing almost all countries (and
which is closely linked to others through the European Economic Area),
within which political, economic and cultural integration is highly
developed and strongly interrelated. Furthermore, having been enlarged
twice in the 2000s, the EU has absorbed most of the elements of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, with the exception of the Western Balkan
states, which are nevertheless connected to the EU through multiple
treaties. This greatly simplifies the treatment of ‘Central Europe’, which
has also been the subject of a great deal of controversy.8 The FSU is
a more difficult concept, for while we can chart the EU region using
economic interconnections, the historical past and political linkages,
the concept of the post-Soviet space by definition is based primarily on
September 7, 2012 10:54 MAC/VINO Page-14 9780230302686_03_cha02
14 The Concept of Eurasian Integration
historical considerations: the countries which belonged to the Soviet
Union (and which currently do not belong to the EU). However, there
is a certain level of economic interdependency among these countries;
most of them also belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) (which is, however, a much weaker alliance than the EU). The
most difficult case is East Asia, where an international structure encom-
passing all countries is absent. We will use a broad definition of the
region encompassing China, Japan, Korea and Mongolia, as well as the
ASEAN countries.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the post-Soviet area in our
analysis should not be treated as a proxy for Russia. Russia is indeed a
key player in many regional integration projects and an important arena
for informal linkages emerging in the region; however, other post-Soviet
countries (particularly Kazakhstan) often take a proactive role.
Related literature
This definition of ‘Eurasian integration’ clearly relates to three debates in
modern economics, IR and political sciences, which will be used in our
further investigation. Firstly, on the level of regionalism, there seems to
be a connection to the discussion of large ‘continental’ regional inte-
gration agreements. The most prominent case is the Free Trade Area
of the Americas (FTAA), which was discussed in 1993–2003 but has
thus far never been implemented. Further examples include the African
Union, the Union of South American Nations and the Asia Cooperation
Dialogue. These large agreements in most cases encompassed highly
heterogeneous countries with conflicting interests, and covered entire
continents, but – so far at least – they have failed to produce any signif-
icant level of economic cooperation and opening up (compared to the
geographically more ‘modest’ unions like the EU or the NAFTA).
It should be noted, however, that South America and Africa are much
less heterogeneous than ‘Eurasia’ as defined above; so, in fact, the lessons
to be learned from these large structures are rather limited. However, the
argument regarding ‘continental’ blocs – at least in the area of trade –
should not be dismissed lightly; while the argument is often associated
with problems of political economy, from the welfare perspective, Paul
Krugman9 argues that it is an attractive solution. Krugman’s belief is
that continental trade blocs are ‘natural’ because costs of trade between
continents are substantially higher than within continents. The welfare-
enhancing effects of continental trade blocs have been disputed,10 and
Eurasia does not necessarily constitute a ‘continent’ in Krugman’s sense,
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that is, an area of relatively low transportation costs – we will address
this issue below.
The second strand of literature concentrates on the more modest
approach of what might be called ‘inter-regionalism’, that is, interac-
tion between already existing regional integration agreements. In some
senses, the very structure of our study assumes that there is an inter-
regionalism logic: we defined Eurasian integration as a field of interaction
between regions. Eurasia has indeed been a continent of numerous inter-
regional structures, which are partly relevant (as in the case of the
Asia-Europe Meeting or ASEM) to the linkages we study. The inter-
regionalism discussion assumes that regional integration blocs (and,
more specifically, their supranational bureaucracies) are able to accu-
mulate substantial governance capacity to act as independent players in
the international arena. In this case, inter-regionalism simultaneously
influences the relations between individual regions and intra-regional
dynamics, possibly strengthening the cohesion and reinforcing the
power of supranational institutions. Inter-regionalism could, moreover,
promote the idea of regional integration to less organized regions and
strengthen the global power of more organized ones.11
The effects of inter-regionalism are so far relatively limited and con-
centrated on symbolic action and humanitarian cooperation: David
Camroux refers to inter-regionalism as ‘imagined alchemy’ with a very
limited scope within the existing structure of international bargaining.12
For the Eurasian case, furthermore, where the boundaries between the
three regions are not well defined and the level of cooperation is very
low in two of the regions at least, the logic of inter-regionalism is likely
to tell only part of the story. Yet it can be an important part, and we will
consider it further in this book.
The third strand of the literature, unlike the first two, looks primarily
at the spontaneous regionalization of the world economy. The problem
is that for regionalization, even more than for regionalism, determining
regional boundaries is an extremely difficult task: in many cases they do
not coincide with well-established ideas of where the borders between
the regions lie, and even less with the borders of individual states, as we
go on to show in this study. While most of the literature dealing with
regionalization concentrates on culturally and economically homoge-
nous regions, some papers also look at ‘continental’ regionalization.
For instance, it has been shown that for Asia, Oceania, America and
Europe (but not for Africa) there exists a ‘continental trade bias’,
that is, countries of the same continent significantly over-trade with
each other, taking into account the predictions of gravity equations.13
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However, ocean can be an even stronger integrator than continent.14
Alan Rugman suggests that most supposedly ‘global’ corporations have
a clear focus, for example, Europe or East Asia.15 However, does it make
sense to look at ‘Eurasia’ (as defined above) in line with these regions? Or
in this case, given the high transportation costs for Central Eurasia and
the huge heterogeneity of countries, does belonging to the same conti-
nent fragment rather than integrate? We intend to explore this further
below.
Whither Eurasia?
From the geographical perspective, ‘Eurasia’ seems to be the correct label
to assign to the trilateral economic, political and cultural linkages we
intend to study: in fact, we are looking at the interaction of European
and Asian countries. The problem is that the active usage of the word
‘Eurasia’ makes it necessary to show what we do not look at or assume
in this book. As Abbot Gleason puts it, ‘Eurasia is also a trope, a figure
of speech’;16 there is substantial ideological weight attached to the word
‘Eurasia’, at least in some countries and in some communities.17 Thus,
in the next section we will briefly cover the history of and define our
own usage of the term ‘Eurasia’.
Marlène Laruelle asserts that the term ‘Eurasian’ was actually invented
in the 19th century to refer to children of mixed European–Asian
couples, and it was later used to highlight the geological unity of
the continent.18 Although even in the 1980s Eurasia was an obscure
term used by geographers and groups ranging from Russian émigrés
to Turkish neofascists, since the 1990–2000s, Eurasia has come into
common usage. The remark by Nikolay Trubetskoy in 1921 grasps the
essence of the situation: ‘. . . the term ‘Eurasia’ [is] maybe not very felic-
itous, but it catches the eye and [is] therefore suitable for purposes of
agitation.’19 This, of course, may be a very serious flaw from the point of
view of scientific investigation, which is designed to operate with value-
free concepts. Geographical regions are, in fact, rarely value-free: the
notion of ‘Europe’ illustrates this quite clearly. However, they are still
usually less controversial and ‘loaded’ than the concept of Eurasia.
Eurasia as the post-Soviet area
There are three main concepts of Eurasia. The first one is simply a
convenient substitute for the concept of ‘post-Soviet area’ or (as it is
often called in Russia) ‘nearest neighbourhood’. Since 1991, geogra-
phers, economists and political and social scientists have struggled with
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the terminological ambiguity concerning the states of the former Soviet
Union. The term ‘post-Soviet area’ (or ‘space’) is largely used along with
the ‘former Soviet Union’ (FSU). Another commonly used description is
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, all of these
denominators have obvious deficiencies. To begin with, the first two
terms are derived from the historic context, that is, they draw on a
non-existent political entity. Conversely, the CIS draws on an existing
political entity, which has only limited relevance to the politics and eco-
nomics of the region. Aside from this, all of these terms only artificially
combine the actual political and economic geography of the region. The
straightforward solution to the problem would be to find an appropri-
ate geographical description of the territory in question, and a popular
suggestion has been to use the term ‘Eurasia’.20
The reasons for the existence of this concept are, once again, three-
fold. Firstly, the very notion of ‘post-Soviet’ seems to be transitory in
nature: it raises the question of when the term post-Soviet can no longer
be used. Secondly, there are substantial similarities and connections
between the former Soviet republics, which makes considering them as
part of one region more meaningful. The extent to which post-Soviet
countries are still linked to or are similar to each other, and to which
these linkages are determined by their common past, is unclear. For
example, the Aims and Scope of Post-Communist Economies, one of the
key journals relating to this region’s economies, state that ‘despite the
dramatic changes that have taken place, the post-communist economies
still form a clearly identifiable group, distinguished by the impact of
the years of communist rule’.21 In the same way, Buzan and Waever
describe the post-Soviet area as part of a single ‘regional security
complex’.22 On the other hand, Gleason concludes that there are no sub-
stantial similarities between post-Soviet countries,23 Trenin proclaims
the ‘end of Eurasia’24 and Tsygankov ‘Eurasia’s meltdown’.25 If one
concludes that the only reason for the similarities and/or interdepen-
dencies is their Soviet past or that there are no meaningful similarities/
interdependencies to study, one does not need to search for a new name
for the region. But if the similarities/interdependencies result not only
from their Soviet period but also from current developments (or, per-
haps, pre-Soviet history), one requires a new designation. Because of
the geography of the largest country of the region, Russia, it becomes
attractive to call the region ‘Eurasia’.26
The third reason for the appearance of these concepts of ‘Eurasia’ is
more academic in origin. Studying post-Soviet countries still requires the
specific skills of a researcher and, especially, knowledge of the Russian
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language, which most still have (although this situation is likely to
change considerably in the foreseeable future). Therefore, these aca-
demics form a discrete scholarly community, which requires a name,
and if one has to give Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan a single title
without using the outdated term ‘post-Soviet’, ‘Eurasia’ seems to be
appropriate enough. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is used by
many important journals (Eurasian Geography and Economics, Europe-Asia
Studies instead of Post-Soviet Geography and Economics and Soviet Studies).
The American journal Kritika, re-established in 2000, has the subtitle
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History.
In academia, the old Soviet studies centres are now often called
‘Eurasian’ centres: Harvard (Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian
Studies), Columbia (Harriman Institute: Russian, Eurasian and Eastern
European Studies), Berkeley (Institute of Slavic, East European and
Eurasian Studies), Stanford (Center for Russian, East European and
Eurasian Studies), Illinois Champaign-Urbana (Russian, East European
and Eurasian Center), Toronto (Centre for European, Russian and
Eurasian Studies), Leuven (Russia and Eurasia Research Group) and so
on. St Anthony’s College at Oxford has a Russian and Eurasian Centre,
while the Business School at Cambridge University has a Eurasia Centre.
But names have remained unchanged at the University of London
(SSEES: School of Slavonic and East European Studies, the name dating
back to 1915) and at Birmingham University (CREES: Centre for Russian
and East European Studies, dating back to 1963). The larger UK com-
munity still convenes as the British Association of Slavonic and East
European Studies. In Sweden, after 1991, the (late 1960s) Department of
Soviet and East European Studies at Uppsala University became first the
Department of East European Studies, and then, with EU accession, the
Department of Eurasian Studies, which encompasses Central Asia and
China, too.27 The East Asian Russia and Central Asia scholars regularly
meet at ‘East Asian Slavic Eurasian Studies’ conferences (since 2009); the
International Congress of Central and East European Studies (ICCEES)
devoted its world congress in 2010 to the topic of ‘Eurasia’.
One could argue that a blend of specific qualifications is required
to study the region (although academic requirements in this regard
appear to be getting less stringent: for economists, their knowledge
of econometrics and microeconomics is much more important than
their knowledge of Russia or Kazakhstan specifically, and in politi-
cal science the generation of scholars who were trained specifically to
study this region has been replaced by a generation of comparativists
with broader academic backgrounds28) and to understand the need of a
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specific community to preserve itself in a changing world. One possible
alternative is to use the term ‘Slavic’ (which is still used by a number
of prominent research centres, as described above), but this does not
cover Central Asia and the Caucasus; on the contrary, it includes coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe, which seem to be very different
institutionally from the post-Soviet area. Given the growing scholarly
interest in Central Asia and the declining attention to Central and
Eastern Europe, calling oneself a ‘Slavic Studies’ centre (at least, in social
sciences) seems to place oneself at a disadvantage amid tough academic
competition. In any case, this ‘academic’ Eurasia has very clear borders,
coinciding with the former Soviet Union (with the exception of the
three Baltic states, which became part of the EU and thus of ‘Central
and Eastern Europe’), with partial ‘breakaway’ countries including other
post-Socialist countries (mostly of Central and Eastern Europe, rarely
China).
Post-Soviet political elites and governments also actively use the term
‘Eurasian’ to describe their interconnections, probably for the same
reasons as academics: on the one hand, there are certain issues and
problems these countries are better equipped to solve together, but on
the other hand, it is hardly acceptable to use the term ‘post-Soviet’ for
any new political group. In some senses, the problem is that there has
been no common term to describe the region post-Soviet countries are
located in. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was so called to pre-
vent any clear geographic connotations that reflected the ambitions and
the hopes of its founders regarding world revolution. Therefore, there
was simply no term the Soviet republics could use to describe them-
selves: no explicitly geographic one (as opposed to ex-Yugoslavia, for
which the term ‘Western Balkans’ seems most obvious, especially since
Albania shares many problems of the former Yugoslavian republics) and
no historical one (before the USSR, most republics had been part of
the Russian Empire, but any reference to Russia was clearly not accept-
able to the elites constructing their new nations). In the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the international and supranational structures envisaged
for the regions countries (such as the Union of Sovereign States or the
Commonwealth of Independent States) used extremely ambiguous des-
ignations (stressing the independence of rather than the connections
between the countries). When in the 2000s new regional structures
began to emerge, it became more acceptable to describe the new region
as ‘Eurasia’: the term has been used for the Eurasian Union suggested
by Nursultan Nazarbaev in the early 1990s, the Eurasian Economic
Community and the Eurasian Development Bank.
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The notion of ‘Eurasia’ instead of ‘post-Soviet area’ is also employed
by practitioners in the Western world.29 The US Department of State
moved early on to form the ‘European and Eurasian’ bureau for the
former Soviet republics. Interestingly, this bureau does not include the
five Central Asian republics, which fall into the remit of the Bureau
of South and Central Asian Affairs, which handles US foreign policy
and relations with India, South Asian states and the Central Asian
‘Stans’. The Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs gained a
new title when responsibility for policy on five countries – Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan – was transferred
from the former bureau to the latter. The United States also has a
National Security Council Directorate for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasian
Affairs. Another example is the Eurasia Foundation, funded largely by
USAID. For us, however, it is important that the geographical scope of
this organization is defined primarily as the post-Soviet area (Russia,
South Caucasus, Ukraine and Moldova). Various banks have followed
the same logic to delimit the geographic scope of their departments.
The Nordic Investment Bank is the example we use. For the NIB, Eurasia
means 12 countries of the former Soviet Union. There is no apparent
hesitation about the non-inclusion of ‘Europe’ in ‘Eurasia’.
Eurasianism as an anti-Western ideology
The second notion of Eurasia considers it rather as an ideological
concept, stressing (quite often) the differences between Russia and its
neighbours and the European world and, partly, the commonalities
between Russia and the Eastern states. The borders of this ‘Eurasia’ are
much more vague than the borders of ‘post-Soviet’ Eurasia. One can
claim with a high level of certainty that it does not include Europe
(in fact, asked directly by one of the authors of this book whether
Eurasia includes Europe, a Russian academic at the Second East Asian
Slavic Eurasian (!) Studies Conference in Seoul in March 2010 answered
with a very emphatic ‘No’), but even here there are some differences;
its southern and eastern borders are drawn very differently by different
proponents of the concept.
As an ideology, this Russian Eurasianism is officially almost 100 years
old, since it was first coined by Russian émigrés who fled the Bolshevik
Revolution of 1917 and the ensuing civil war. However, the con-
cept is also deeply rooted in the Russian search for identity. Fyodor
Dostoyevsky said in 1881: ‘in Europe we were Tatars, but in Asia we
too are Europeans’. Apparently little has changed since then. For Asians,
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Russia’s civilization and culture are essentially European, while for the
West, Russia is a ‘semi-Asiatic’ country.
The school of Russian Eurasianists emerged later, as intellectu-
als were driven out of Russia with the first wave of emigrants at
the beginning of the 1920s. It drew on 19th-century perceptions of
Russia as a ‘third continent’, and early 20th-century mostly literary
pan-Mongolism, Scythism and Asianism. The following statement by
Trubeckoy (1925) summarizes their ideas quite clearly: ‘The territory of
Russia . . . constitutes a separate continent . . .which in contrast to Europe
and Asia can be called Eurasia . . .Eurasia represents an integral whole,
both geographically and anthropologically . . .By its very nature, Eurasia
is historically destined to comprise a single state entity. From the begin-
ning the political unification of Eurasia was a historical inevitability, and
the geography of Eurasia indicated the means to achieve it.’30
There were virtually no economists who supported Eurasianism, with
the possible exception of the geographer and economist Petr Savitskiy.
Perhaps as a consequence, classic Eurasianism is more of a cultural and
geographical concept, even sometimes a poetic one. It identified Russia
as a third continent within the Old World, with neither a European nor
an Asian culture. At the same time, an important feature of Eurasianism
is that it opens up to the Turko-Mongol world and acknowledges the
Turko-Mongol roots of Russian culture, geography and the state.
During the Soviet and especially post-Soviet periods, there emerged
a number of ideological traditions, which described themselves as
‘Eurasianist’, although they were often quite dissimilar from the original
movement. The best known of the Soviet Eurasianists is Lev Gumilev,
originally a historian of the nomadic tribes of the Great Steppes between
China and Russia, who became much better known for his ideas on
‘ethnogenesis’, that is, the evolution, birth and death of ethnoses based
on the concept of ‘passionarity’, a genetic mutation responsible for the
vital energy and power aspirations of certain ethnic groups.31 Many
post-Soviet scholars and the public assume his ethnic theories were sci-
entifically proven (though possibly with some reservations regarding the
formation of passionarity). But the fact that it has become almost impos-
sible to criticize his theories in Russia and Kazakhstan is an indication
of their unscientific nature.32 In fact, Gumilev’s writings on passionar-
ity are not historiographical; readers are not presented with the sources
of his theses on history, and the footnotes only mention secondary
works (this does not apply to his more grounded research on the Great
Steppes). It is thus difficult to engage in a discourse with his followers.
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Gumilev’s aim was to stress the historic connections between Russia and
the Great Steppes, subscribing once again therefore to ‘Eurasianist’ ideas
of separation between Russia and Europe.
Nevertheless, it was not until the collapse of the Soviet Union that
‘Eurasianism’ became popular among certain groups in Russia. The most
prominent proponents of this ‘Eurasianism’ are probably Aleksandr
Dugin and the late Aleksandr Panarin. The thrust of their teachings is
geopolitical, traditionalistic and anti-globalistic, showing great affinity
for Orthodox Christianity and presenting Russia as an optimal model
for the multipolar world. As with Gumilev, their views have a dis-
tinctly anti-semitic flavour, presenting current globalization as a form
of ‘Judaization of the world’.33 Debate among Western scientists has
mainly focused on Dugin and his supposed influence on Russian pol-
icy making. Laruelle asserts, meanwhile, and we agree, that Dugin and
Panarin – and Gumilev most especially – are highly regarded in the
post-Soviet area as scientists.34 Their ideas and theories – presented
as scientific truths – are taught to students not only at universities
(in Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and so on) but also in high schools.
Gumilev’s teachings are seen as important for contemporary Russia, and
even more so for Kazakhstan.
The support that this group of ‘Eurasianists’ provides to conserva-
tive, anti-Western and expansionist factions among Russian political
elites cannot be underestimated. Their theories also have deep roots in
the popular self-perception of Russians: the majority of them identify
themselves neither with Europe nor Asia. According to a Russian Pub-
lic Opinion Research Centre (VCIOM) poll in 2001, 71% of respondents
said they believed Russia to be a one-of-a-kind civilization, ‘Euro-Asian
or Orthodox’, as was formulated in the poll. Only 13% believed that
Russia belongs to Western civilization.35 This is particularly interesting
since, for example, Chinese and Koreans generally perceive Russians as
‘Europeans’ (we do not have unequivocal evidence for that; the claim is
based on conversations with colleagues in the region). The influence of
this ‘Eurasianism’ is the main reason why certain intellectuals (Mykola
Ryabchuk36 most prominently) reject the usage of this term in any con-
text, especially with respect to Ukraine, which in their eyes is clearly
a ‘European’ country that suffers from the influence of ‘post-Soviet’ or
‘Eurasian’ culture.
Related to this is the fact that the term ‘Eurasianists’, in the jar-
gon of Russian international relations theory, was used in the 1990s to
describe those promoting the uniqueness of Russian geopolitical goals,
as opposed to the ‘Atlantists’ who focused on Russia’s integration into
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the Western world. Whether this division and terminology make sense
is questionable.37 Firstly, the very existence of ‘Atlantists’ has never
been proven (it appears that they were rather constructed as a conve-
nient opponent). Secondly, referring to the opponents of ‘Atlantists’ as
‘Eurasianists’ is also not entirely rational, since the latter very often have
nothing to do with the Eurasianists we have described above (although
some of them clearly do: Dugin, for instance, is Eurasianist in both
senses) and do not always consider relations with post-Soviet or Asian
countries as their main focus (quite a few of them concentrate on bilat-
eral relations between Russia and the United States or Russia and the
‘West’, interpreting them as a confrontation or competition between
these two poles; for them ‘Eurasia’ seems to be simply a synonym for
Russia that conveys its importance and geopolitical ambitions, as well
as its possible civilization identity38). Therefore, some papers suggest
a more differentiated approach, where ‘Eurasianists’ are not the only
group outside the ‘Atlantist’ camp in Russian international relations
scholarship.39 Nevertheless, quite a few Russian scholars describe them-
selves as ‘Eurasianists’, and once again, this implies entirely different
things. Finally, as we will show in the next section, there is no rea-
son to assume ‘Eurasianism’ and critical perception of the West are
synonymous – on the contrary, they can be powerfully opposed to one
another.
It is worth noting that essentially anti-Western ‘Eurasianists’ use a
term, which in itself is a Eurocentric construct, albeit invented on a dis-
tant peninsula of that landmass. From the point of view of population
or land size, ‘Asiopa’ is statistically more correct! Or, rather, the rele-
vant geographic and historical unit is really ‘Afro-Eurasia’.40 From the
point of view of political, demographic and economic history, as well as
anthropology, it could also be called ‘Afrasia’. In some senses, even the
term ‘Asia’ as such is highly questionable: according to Chas Freeman,
‘for thousands of years after strategists in Greece came up with this
Eurocentric notion [of Asia – E.V., A.L.], the many non-European peoples
who inhabited the Eurasian landmass were blissfully unaware that they
were supposed to share an identity as “Asians” ’.41 Such terms as ‘Near
East’, ‘Middle East’ and ‘Far East’ also betray a Eurocentric approach,
which emerged as part of the first wave of Oriental studies at a time of
European expansion. For example, the term ‘Middle East’ seems to have
originated in the 1850s in the British India Office. This is not surpris-
ing and reveals once again that for ‘Eurasianists’ it is more important
to ‘draw a line’ between Europe (or, possibly, ‘Atlantic civilization’, as
Dugin’s writing suggests) and the ‘Eurasian’ world than to understand
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clearly how the ‘Eurasian’ world itself evolves – an ideological rather
than scientific project (although it is often disguised as a development
in social sciences).
It is interesting to note that this perception of Eurasia as an ‘anti-
Western’ concept also has parallels in English language literature. Janusz
Bugajski describes the Eurasian space as a region of Russian dominance
and associates the expansion of this space with the imperialistic ambi-
tions of Russia.42 His main idea is probably more focused on geopolitical
dominance than on ideological unity – that is also the reason why
his ‘Eurasia’ is able to increase its scope to the broader Russian sphere
of influence. But the idea is basically the same as it is for Russian
Eurasianists: Eurasia and the West are clearly incompatible, and the
first three letters of the word ‘Eurasia’ are probably inserted there
accidentally.
Eurasia as Europe+Asia
The third notion of Eurasia, unlike the previous one, clearly defines
the space as including both Europe and Asia. Laruelle uses the expres-
sion ‘pragmatic Eurasianism’ to describe Russia’s desire to accentuate
its political and economic presence in Asia. The idea of ‘pragmatic
Eurasianism’ is clear: to support interaction between various parts of the
continent. Unlike ‘post-Soviet’ or ‘ideological’ Eurasianism, this ‘prag-
matic’ approach is not based on ‘shared history’ or ‘shared future’: thus,
the core concept involves actual economic and political ties between
countries.
This ‘pragmatic’ Eurasianism is obviously a particular preoccu-
pation among the political elites of other post-Soviet countries,
where it is sometimes combined, surprisingly, with domestic nation-
building programmes and ideologies. This is particularly the case in
Kazakhstan. Quoting the famous 19th-century Kazakh ethnographer
Chokan Valikhanov, Kazakh historians point out that ‘Eurasia is not
synonymous with Russia’.43 Under Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan
became a major proponent of ‘post-Soviet Eurasianism’. Nazarbayev is
rightly viewed as the originator and champion of the idea of ‘Eurasian
integration’ in the FSU and of the special role which Kazakhstan has
to play in this process.44 He called Kazakhstan ‘the Eurasian bridge’,
implying a country with geographic, cultural and historic affiliation
to both Europe and Asia. Based on this concept, Nazarbayev has pro-
posed a number of far-reaching integration projects that are widely
known as ‘Eurasian’ projects. He embodies a pragmatic, economics-
based Eurasianism, whose integrationist ideas are popular among those
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who have suffered as a result of the breakdown of links between the
former Soviet republics.
Eurasianism in Kazakhstan of the type envisaged by Nursultan
Nazarbayev (which is by no means the only type that has existed in this
country in recent decades – we could also mention Olzhas Suleimenov,
whose ideas also do not fit easily into any of the models discussed
in this chapter) differs from any other form of Eurasianism in Russia
in several respects. Firstly, although for Russians at home and abroad,
Eurasianism has always been interpreted as a philosophy, an ideology
or even a science, the Eurasianism of Nazarbayev does not aspire to
become an intellectual movement. It is rather a set of foreign policy
ideas or directions for international cooperation. Secondly, it is explic-
itly and unambiguously open to Europe: in fact, Kazakhstan’s presidency
of the OSCE is considered an example of the Eurasian orientation of the
country that is similar to its membership of the EurAsEC or cooperation
with Asian countries. Thirdly, it is a set of ideas (or rhetoric) promoted
‘from above’: to our knowledge, no Russian government has ever openly
adopted the ideas of Eurasianists or even referred to them to justify a
particular political orientation. Eurasianism in Kazakhstan is in no sense
hostile to modernization – on the contrary, it seems to be clearly com-
patible with the economic liberalization pursued by Kazakhstan for the
last 20 years. Finally, this Eurasianism is clearly not Russia-centric, as it
normally is in Russia.45
The call for a political and economic re-integration (between the for-
mer Soviet republics, and with the neighbouring Asian powers) is actu-
ally viewed by Laruelle as Eurasianism’s most attractive feature.46 This
broader notion of Eurasia is also reflected in the names of international
organizations, for example, the Eurasian Group against Money Laun-
dering (EAG) established by Russia, China, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, India and Kazakhstan. In international
debate, the ideas of ‘pragmatic Eurasianism’ have been clearly present
in the work of Johannes Linn (who entitled the Russian translation of
one of his papers ‘liberal Eurasianism’47); for him Eurasianism seems
primarily to describe the emerging economic linkages in the Eurasian
continent.
A brief summary of the three concepts of Eurasia is presented in
Table 2.1. These three notions rarely exist entirely separately. In fact,
it is very often the case that the concepts are combined in various
ways. It is often hard to discern which concept the authors have
in mind (for example, the ‘pragmatic Eurasianist’ Nazarbayev seems
to refer to other Eurasianists from time to time, in particular Lev
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Gumilev – though Gumilev’s ideas can hardly be said to have a real
influence on Kazakhstan’s foreign policy). In many cases, the word
‘Eurasian’ has been selected merely for the ‘exoticism’ it may infer.
The business world, for example, has adopted the term enthusiastically,
particularly in Kazakhstan, and to a lesser extent Russia: the Eurasian
Natural Resources Corporation (ENRC) – a huge Kazakhstan-based diver-
sified mining company; Eurasian Bank (Kazakhstan) – a second-tier
bank, a member of Eurasian Group; Eurasia Logistics – a Kazakhstan
property development company whose main business interests were
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in Russia (the company ultimately folded, however); there are count-
less trading outlets called ‘Eurasia’ in Kazakhstan; there is even a food
chain in Russia under this name offering Japanese and Uzbek (!) cuisine.
‘Eurasia’ trade and business centres and business associations, for exam-
ple, the Eurasian Bankers’ Club, have also begun to proliferate. In the
United States, the Eurasia Group, headquartered in New York, advises on
political risk. This consultancy deals not only with the countries of the
Eurasian continent but is also happy to advise on the political intricacies
of Venezuela or Sudan, for example.
Given these difficulties, we believe it is prudent to set clear bound-
aries for ‘Eurasia’ as we refer to it in this book. Obviously, ‘Eurasianism’
as political ideology cannot serve as a basis for any reasonable scien-
tific investigation; it can become an object of scientific research, but can
hardly help us to understand the actual interdependencies emerging in
the Eurasian continent. In particular, its inherent scepticism towards
the ‘Western world’ is in sharp contrast to the predominantly market-
driven economic integration that one observes in Eurasia. Dmitriy Trenin
speaks convincingly about the emergence of the ‘new West’, that is,
the modernization and marketization of non-Western societies that is
unavoidably connected to their Westernization.48 It should be noted that
the concept of Westernization here does not imply the exact replication
of the institutions existing in Europe or in North America – which are
partly acknowledged as inefficient and as the outcome of institutional
lock-ins. Throughout this text, Westernization merely implies the will-
ingness to learn from the Western countries (which have been beyond
doubt the most successful on the planet in terms of their development
so far) as far as possible, possibly taking into account some local con-
straints and inefficiencies of the existing institutions themselves but not
rejecting theWest on ideological grounds. From this point of view, Japan
and China present impressive examples of Westernization, which, at the
same time, rely on the historical specificity of these countries. However,
this idea of Westernization is strikingly different from the perception of
the West as an enemy or a rival and rejection of many Western institu-
tions on ideological grounds rather than on grounds of efficiency.49
In Eurasia one is more likely, in fact, to encounter purely market-
based international cooperation than in the EU, for example, which was
designed as a top-down project (we discuss this further below). Cooper-
ation between autocracies in Eurasia is an important issue, which differs
dramatically from the ideal of the ‘new West’, but even in this case
the hypothetical constructions of Eurasianists of various persuasions
have very little to do with political reality and almost never provide
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the ideological foundations for autocratic cooperation (again, we discuss
this issue further below). Thus, for the objectives of this book it is more
important clearly to describe the attributes of ‘Eurasianism’ rather than
to consider its intellectual heritage.
The ‘post-Soviet’ concept of Eurasia is more important to our dis-
cussion. In fact, the authors of this book, in their role as editors of
the Russian language Journal for Eurasian Economic Integration, period-
ically commit the sin of replacing ‘post-Soviet’ with ‘Eurasian’. There
are, however, two problems with this conceptualization. Firstly, the
coherence of the post-Soviet area is highly questionable, as we have
mentioned before. Therefore, if one’s goal is to study the emergence of
new economic and political linkages in the region, looking only at the
post-Soviet states could possibly lead the researcher to overlook the most
important object of investigation. As we show further on, the FSU is still
regarded as a relevant economic entity in some cases, while in others
post-Soviet countries are more closely linked to partners in Europe and
China. Needless to say, there are interesting questions to be answered
concerning the FSU specifically, but they are not central to this book.
The second problem is that by defining the post-Soviet area as ‘Eurasia’,
one automatically assumes that there are limited opportunities for the
region’s countries to become part of the Western community of nations
or, at least, that the persistence of linkages between post-Soviet states
contradicts the Western orientation of integration. This is once again a
questionable assumption from our point of view.
To conclude, redefining the post-Soviet space as ‘Eurasia’ is certainly
misleading. The FSU is not and should not be treated as Eurasia, which
is a continent and a venue for the emerging transcontinental pro-
cesses of economic integration. At the same time, simply utilizing the
‘former Soviet Union’ or the ‘post-Soviet space’ is, in our opinion, not
an option for the long run. These terms are temporary in their gene-
sis and character, as they relate to the region’s past, not its present or
future. To use a rough analogy, it is like calling Austria, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and neighbouring states the ‘former
Austro-Hungarian Empire’. We thus strongly prefer to use geographical
associations and choose Northern and Central Eurasia as a more correct,
neutral and forward-looking term for this region. This in itself is not
entirely without controversy (for example, ‘Central Eurasia’ might also
include Mongolia and possibly Afghanistan and Pakistan50) but is at
least an improvement. In this book, however, we will use ‘Northern
and Central Eurasia’, ‘post-Soviet space’ and ‘former Soviet Union (FSU)’
interchangeably.
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Thus, this book is within the boundaries of the ‘pragmatic’ branch of
Eurasianism. It differentiates itself from the existing research for two rea-
sons. Firstly, we focus heavily on the economic benefits, which increased
cooperation on the Eurasian landmass would generate for all parties
involved. Secondly, we include in our analysis the entire Eurasian conti-
nent. While we believe it has the greatest value for Northern and Central
Eurasia, this concept is not a purely Russian or post-Soviet one. If one
indeed is interested in studying this vast continental landmass, in spite
of all the disadvantages and conceptual confusion, one has no choice
but to stick to Eurasia.
